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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In this Brief, the Appellant will be referred to as the 
"Plaintiff" while the Respondent will be referred to as the 
"Defendant"• This matter was heard in the trial court pursuant to 
the trial court's sua sponte Order To Show Cause why the action 
should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The trial court, 
in ruling upon the matter, dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint and 
entered default judgment against Plaintiff on Defendant's 
Counterclaim. For this reason, the only transcript is that of the 
brief order to show cause hearing. The record on appeal consists 
entirely of the records of the office of the Court Clerk referred 
to in this Brief by the designation "R" followed by the appropriate 
page number and the transcript of the hearing, referred to in this 
Brief by the designation "T" followed by the appropriate page 
reference. Attached as addenda to this Brief are copies of (i) 
Defendant's Precipe and Default on Defendant's Counterclaim, (ii) 
the trial court's Order To Show Cause, (iii) Plaintiff's Objection 
to entry of Default Judgment, (iv) the Order of the First Judicial 
District Court in and for Cache County ("trial court") dated 
September 29, 1988 and (v) the Default Judgment entered against 
Plaintiff dated October 26, 1988. The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure will be referred to herein as "URCP". The Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court will be referred to herein as "RUSC". All 
emphasis is added. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-
2-2(3) Utah Code Annotated of 1953/ as amended, being a case 
involving a Judgment rendered by the "trial court" over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from the Default Judgment entered against 
the Plaintiff by the trial court pursuant to its sua sponte Order 
To Show Cause, subsequent hearing and Order. The Default Judgment 
was signed and entered by the Court on October 26, 1988, over 
Plaintiff's objection. Plaintiff filed its Notice Of Appeal on 
April 4, 1989 and filed concurrently therewith its Motion For 
Relief under Rule 60(b) URCP and Motion For Disqualification. Due 
to the concurrent filing by the Plaintiff of its Notice Of Appeal, 
Motion For Relief and Motion For Disqualification, the trial court 
determined in its Memorandum Decision of May 4, 1989 (copy 
attached) that it was without jurisdiction to rule on Plaintiff's 
Motion For Relief and determined that Plaintiff's Motion For 
Disqualification was moot. Accordingly, this appeal is apparently 
taken from the Default Judgment rather than from any denial by the 
trial court of Plaintiff's Motions. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY PROCEDURAL RULES 
The following are determinative constitutional provisions or 
rules that support the actions of the trial court: 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
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United States and of the State wherein they reside• No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 78-3-4(1), Utah Code Annotated 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all 
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Constitution 
and not prohibited by law. 
Rule 4(a), RUSC 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which 
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the district 
court to the Supreme Court, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the district court 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or 
order appealed from; provided however, when a judgment or 
order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful 
detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall 
be filed with the clerk of the district court within 10 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. 
Rule 5(a) and (b)(1), URCP 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided 
in these rules, every order required by its terms to be 
served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint 
unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous 
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be 
served upon a party unless the court otherwise orders, every 
written notice other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, 
notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d), and 
similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No 
service need be made on parties in default for failure to 
appear except as provided in Rule 55(a)(2) (default 
proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims 
for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the 
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4. 
(b) Service: How made. 
3 
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or 
permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney 
the service shall be made upon the attorney unless service 
upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon 
the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a 
copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, 
if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the 
court. Delivery of a copy within this rule means: Handing 
it to the attorney or to the party; or leaving it at his 
office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or, 
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous 
place therein; or, if the office is closed or the person to 
be served has no office, leaving it at his dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and 
discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete 
upon mailing. 
Rule 8(d), URCP 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to 
which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as 
to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the 
responsive pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no 
responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken 
as denied or avoided. 
Rule 55(b)(2), URCP 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to 
a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, 
in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it 
into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to 
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any 
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order 
such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
Rule 58A(b), (c) and (d), URCP 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in 
Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all 
judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed with the 
clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions 
and judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be 
deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien 
on real property, when the same is signed and filed as herein 
above provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation 
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of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment 
docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing 
party shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of 
judgment to all other parties and shall file proof of service 
of such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time 
for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice 
requirement of this provision, 
ISSUES 
The issues before the Court for resolution are as follows: 
I. Is the Plaintiff's appeal untimely, leaving the Court 
without jurisdiction? 
II. Should the Court now consider matters raised for the 
first time by the Plaintiff on appeal that were not raised at the 
trial court level? 
III. Was the trial court biased against the Plaintiff, 
requiring recusal of the trial court Judge? 
IV. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to 
hold an evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP, prior to the 
entry of the Default Judgment against Plaintiff? 
V. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in entering 
Plaintiff's default on Defendant's Counterclaim? 
VI. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing 
Plaintiff's Complaint? 
VII. Is the Default Judgment entered by the trial court void 
for lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, a Utah corporation, filed its Complaint against 
Defendant, a former employee of Plaintiff, on June 30, 1987. 
Immediately after being served with a Summons and Complaint in this 
matter, Defendant initiated formal discovery, including the 
issuance of interrogatories and taking the deposition of 
Plaintiff's president, in July of 1987. After requesting the Court 
for an extension of time within which to answer Plaintiff's 
Complaint, Defendant filed its Answer and Counterclaim and served 
the Defendant therewith on August 14, 1987. Plaintiff having 
failed to respond to Defendant's Counterclaim within the twenty 
(20) day period allowed by Rule 12 URCP, on September 9, 1987 
Defendant filed its Precipe and Default on Defendant's 
Counterclaim. The Precipe and Default were also served upon the 
Plaintiff under Rule 5 URCP on September 9, 1987. Defendant served 
additional discovery requests upon Plaintiff on September 15, 1987. 
Without moving to set aside the Default, the Plaintiff filed a 
dilatory answer to Defendant's Counterclaim on September 18, 1987. 
Plaintiff having failed to respond to Defendant's discovery 
requests within the time provided by the URCP, Defendant filed its 
Motion To Compel on December 4, 1987. Plaintiff then filed its 
Motion For Protective Order on December 21, 1987. Neither Motion 
was ruled on by the trial court. After the case had been pending 
for approximately fourteen (14) months and without any affirmative 
action being taken by the Plaintiff, excepting Plaintiff's Motion 
For Protective Order, the Court sua sponte issued its Order To Show 
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Cause as to why the action should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute and setting a hearing date on the matter for September 
26, 1988. The Order To Show Cause was served on counsel on 
September 13, 1988. The trial court's Order specifically stated 
that counsel's failure to appear would be considered acquiescence 
in the trial court's order of dismissal. At the hearing on 
September 26, 1988, Defendant was not present, was not represented 
by counsel and had not otherwise responded to the Court's Order. 
Defendant's counsel, Brad H. Bearnson, appeared at the hearing, 
made no objection to the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint and 
made motion to the Court for entry of Default Judgment against the 
Plaintiff on Defendant's Counterclaim, pursuant to the earlier 
Default. Thereupon, Plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed and the 
trial court ordered entry of Default Judgment against Plaintiff on 
Defendant's Counterclaim. Plaintiff's Objection To Dismissal was 
received by the Clerk of the trial court on September 26, 1988 but 
subsequent to the hearing. 
Defendant then served the proposed Order, Default Judgment and 
Affidavit For Attorney's Fees and costs upon the Plaintiff on 
September 27, 1988 and filed the same with the trial court. 
Plaintiff objected to the entry of the Default Judgment and the 
proposed Order, on September 27, 1988. The trial court signed and 
entered the Order on September 29, 1988. The Order provides for 
the dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint and entry of default 
judgment against the Plaintiff under Defendant's Counterclaim. 
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Thereafter, the trial court signed and entered the Default Judgment 
on Octobesr 26, 1988. This appeal by Plaintiff followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The procedural chronology of this case as shown from the 
Clerk's file and the transcript of the hearing of September 26, 
1988 is as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint was filed June 30, 1987. (R. 1-3) 
While Defendant was served with a Summons and Complaint in the 
matter, Plaintiff has apparently failed to provide the Court with 
a Return of Service, as none appears in the record. 
2. Shortly after service of the Summons and Complaint upon 
the Defendant, Defendant's counsel prepared its first set of formal 
discovery requests which were filed with the trial court and served 
upon Plaintiff on July 14, 1987. (R. 4-10) Defendant then noticed 
and took the deposition of Plaintiff's President, Mr. Sidney 
Thatcher, on July 27, 1988. (R. 11-12) 
3. Defendant filed its Motion For Extension Of Time within 
which to answer Plaintiff's Complaint on July 22, 1987 (R. 13-14) 
which was followed by the Memorandum Decision dated August 12, 1987 
of the trial court denying the entry of default against the 
Defendant on Plaintiff's Complaint, dated August 12, 1987. (R. 15) 
Defendant filed its Answer and Counterclaim on August 14, 1987. 
(R. 16-18) Also on August 14, 1987, Defendant served the Answer 
and Counterclaim upon Plaintiff by mail, pursuant to Rule 5 URCP. 
(R. 18) Under Rule 12 URCP the Reply to the Counterclaim was due 
September 3, 1987. 
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4. No reply to Defendant's Counterclaim having been filed by 
the Plaintiff within the twenty (20) day period permitted under 
Rule 12 URCP, Defendant filed its Precipe and the Default of the 
Plaintiff, relative to Defendant's Counterclaim on September 9, 
1987, (R. 19-22) On that same date copies of the Precipe and the 
Default were served upon the Defendant by mail, (R. 20 and 22) 
5. On September 15, 1988, Defendant filed and served upon 
Plaintiff its Second Set Of Interrogatories And Request For 
Production Of Documents. (R. 23-29) 
6. Plaintiff filed its dilatory Answer to Defendant's 
Counterclaim on September 18, 1987, some thirty-five (35) days 
after the filing and service of the Counterclaim upon Plaintiff and 
fifteen (15) days after it was due. (R. 30-31) 
7. Plaintiff never made a motion to set aside the Default and 
Plaintiff has never claimed, whether in its brief on appeal or with 
the trial court, that it did not actually receive or was not 
properly served with the Counterclaim or with the Default. 
8. Without responding to Defendant's first set of discovery 
requests, on October 19, 1987 Plaintiff filed its response to 
Defendant's second set of discovery requests. (R. 32-40) 
9. Plaintiff having failed to respond to Defendant's first 
set of discovery requests, Defendant filed its Motion For Order 
Compelling Discovery and served the same upon Defendant on December 
4, 1987. (R. 41-42) Thereafter, Defendant filed its Motion and 
Memorandum for Protective Order and Opposition To Motion. (R. 43-
44) The parties each filed responses to opposing party motions. 
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(R. 45-50) No ruling was made on either Motion by the trial court. 
10. More than fourteen (14) months from the filing of 
Plaintiff's Complaint, the trial court issued its sua sponte Order 
To Show Cause on September 13, 1988, directing counsel for 
Plaintiff and Defendant to appear before the trial court on 
September 26, 1988 at 10:03 a.m. and to there show cause why the 
case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 51-52) 
The Order To Show Cause specifically stated, "Counsel's failure to 
appear will be considered acquiescence in entry of an order of 
dismissal." 
11. At the scheduled September 26 hearing, Defendant's 
counsel, Brad H. Bearnson, appeared representing the Defendant. 
However, neither Plaintiff or its counsel was present nor had 
Plaintiff otherwise responded to the trial court's Order To Show 
Cause. (R. 65-66 and T. 1) 
12. From June 30, 1987 to September 26, 1988, Plaintiff had 
engaged in no formal discovery and the only action taken by 
Plaintiff in the matter was in response to action (discovery) 
initiated by Defendant. 
13. Subsequent to the September 26 hearing, Plaintiff's 
Objection To Dismissal was received by the Clerk of the trial court 
along with Plaintiff's First Request For Admissions And 
Interrogatories. (R. 54-61) 
14. On September 27, 1988 Defendant served Plaintiff with 
the proposed Order (R. 65-66), proposed Default Judgment (R. 73-
74) and Affidavit for attorney's fees and costs. (R. 62-64) 
10 
Defendant filed the Affidavit with the trial court on September 27, 
1988 and the Order and Default Judgment were filed on September 29, 
1988 and October 3, 1988, respectively. 
15. Prior to execution and entry of either the proposed Order 
or the Default Judgment, Plaintiff filed its Objection thereto on 
September 27, 1988. (R. 68-69) Plaintiff made no other objection 
to either the proposed Order or Default Judgment until Plaintiff 
filed its Notice Of Appeal. 
16. The trial court signed and entered the Order on September 
29, 1988. (R. 65-67) 
17. The trial court executed and entered the Default Judgment 
on Defendant's Counterclaim on October 26, 1988, over Plaintiff's 
Objection. (R. 73-75) No evidentiary hearing was held pursuant 
to Rule 55(b)(2) URCP. However, Plaintiff made no request for an 
evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) and did not object to the 
lack of such hearing in its Objection to Entry of Default Judgment. 
(R. 68-69) The Defendant did not serve notice of entry of judgment 
upon the Plaintiff. 
18. Plaintiff alleges that it did not become aware of entry 
of the Default Judgment until March 8, 1989. (R. 94) 
19. Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on the Default 
Judgment on April 4, 1989. (R. 76) Thereafter, on April 5, 1989, 
Plaintiff filed motions for Relief from the Default Judgment and 
for disqualification of the trial court Judge, together with a 
supporting affidavit and memoranda. (R. 85-116) 
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20. Plaintiff's Motion For Relief From Default Judgment was 
not ruled upon by the trial court on the basis that the trial court 
had lost jurisdiction of this action upon filing of the Notice of 
Appeal. The trial court determined Plaintiff's Motion For 
Disqualification was moot and likewise did not rule thereon. (R. 
127-128) 
21. Apparently feeling that the trial court still retained 
some authority to act on this matter, the Plaintiff filed its 
Supplemental Memorandum Of Points And Authorities relative to its 
earlier motion for relief from the Default Judgment, under Rule 
60(b)(5) and (7) URCP, with subsequent respons ive pleadings from 
both parties. (R. 156-311) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. In violation of Rule 4(a), RUSC, Plaintiff failed to file 
its Notice of Appeal within thirty (30) days after entry of the 
Default Judgment. Neither Plaintiff's concurrent motions nor 
Defendant's failure to give Plaintiff Notice of Entry of Default 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 58A(d) tolled the time for appeal. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff's appeal is untimely. 
II. The issues raised on appeal were not raised at the trial 
court. However/ Plaintiff had ample opportunity to do so. After 
the trial court entered its order directing entry of Default 
Judgment against Plaintiff, but before actual entry thereof, 
Plaintiff filed its Objection to the entry of such Default 
Judgment. Plaintiff failed to raise the issues of judicial bias 
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and lack of evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP in its 
Objection and should not be granted a review of those issues. 
III. The issue of bias is to be first addressed in the sound 
discretion of the trial court Judge against whom bias is alleged. 
However, Plaintiff failed to raise the issue of bias in the lower 
court and there is no record provided the Court upon which to make 
a review of such issue. In the absence of such a record, there is 
no showing of bias and the decisions of the trial court should 
stand. 
IV. Rule 55(b) URCP provides that default judgment may be 
entered by the clerk on a claim for a sum certain or where the sum 
can be made certain by computation. Default judgment is to be 
entered by the Court in all other cases. The Default Judgment 
entered against Plaintiff was for a sum certain and as such did not 
require an evidentiary hearing. Further, the necessity of such a 
hearing is left in the discretion of the trial court and where no 
abuse of that discretion is shown by Plaintiff the absence of such 
hearing has no effect on the validity of the Default Judgment 
entered against Plaintiff. 
V. Where Plaintiff failed to file a timely reply to 
Defendant's Counterclaim, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in entering Plaintiff's Default thereon. Plaintiff's 
previously filed Complaint cannot reasonably constitute a reply to 
Defendant's Counterclaim inasmuch as Rules 8 and 12 of the URCP 
require specific responses to claims for affirmative relief and 
state that averments in a counterclaim are deemed admitted if not 
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properly denied• It is within the sound discretion of the trial 
court to determine whether or not Plaintiff made a sufficient reply 
to Defendant's Counterclaim and this Court should not interfere 
with that decision unless it clearly appears the trial court abused 
its discretion. The Plaintiff failing to make such a showing, the 
Court affirms the decision of the trial court in entering Default 
Judgment against Plaintiff, 
VI. The authority of a court to dismiss a party's Complaint 
is an inherent power necessarily vested in the Court. Plaintiffs 
are required to prosecute their claims with due diligence. Where 
Plaintiff took no affirmative action in this case for a period of 
approximately fourteen (14) months from the date of filing its 
Complaint, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. 
VII. A judgment is presumed to be valid and every reasonable 
presumption in favor of the validity of a judgment will be indulged 
absent a clear showing of irregularity. Where the trial court had 
jurisdiction over both parties and the subject matter and where 
there are no limits on judgments rendered by the trial court, the 
Judgment is not void for lack of jurisdiction. Further, where the 
Plaintiff has been provided notice and opportunity for hearing and 
where there is no showing of a lack of fairness, the Plaintiff has 
not been denied due process of law. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL IS UNTIMELY, LEAVING THE COURT WITHOUT 
JURISDICTION. 
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Rule 4(a) RUSC reads in pertinent part as follows: 
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right 
from the district court to the supreme court, the notice of 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the 
district court within thirty (30 ^  days after entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from, . . 
Rule 58A(b) and (c) states: 
(b) . . . All judgments shall be signed by the judge and filed 
with the clerk. 
(c) A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for 
all purposes . . . when the same is entered and filed as 
hereinabove provided. 
On October 26, 1988 the trial court entered the Default 
Judgment against Plaintiff on Defendant's Counterclaim. (R. 73-
74) More than five (5) months after entry of the final Default 
Judgment, April 4, 1989, Plaintiff filed its Notice Of Appeal. 
(R. 76) Accordingly, Plaintiff's appeal is untimely and leaves the 
Court without jurisdiction. Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 
282 P.2d 845 (1958); Former Rule 73(a) URCP and Rule 4 RUSC. 
Further, neither the subsequently filed motions by the Plaintiff 
nor Defendant's failure to give Plaintiff notice of entry of the 
Default Judgment tolls the time for appeal on the Default Judgment. 
Concurrent with its filing of the Notice Of Appeal herein, 
Plaintiff filed separate motions for relief from the Default 
Judgment, under Rule 60(b) URCP, and for disqualification of the 
trial judge, under Rule 63 URCP. These motions by Plaintiff were 
both untimely and were not of a nature that would act to toll the 
time for appeal. The Utah Court of Appeals has held that such 
improper and untimely motions do not toll the time for appeal. 
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Arnica Mutual Insurance Company v. Shettler, 768 P.2d 950, 969 (Utah 
App. 1989), citing Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 
1987). Plaintiff had opportunity and did in fact object to the 
entry of Default Judgment against it on Defendant's Counterclaim. 
(R. 68-69) Plaintiff's objection in this regard was properly 
construed by the trial court as a motion for relief under Rule 
60(b) URCP, since once judgment by default is entered it can only 
be set aside pursuant to a Rule 60(b) Motion. Calder Brothers 
Company v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926, N.4 (Utah 1982). The trial 
court's emtry of its Order (R. 53 and 65-66) dismissing Plaintiff's 
Complaint and directing entry of default judgment on Defendant's 
Counterclaim, together with the trial court's subsequent entry of 
default judgment (R. 73-75) constitutes a denial of Plaintiff's 
Rule 60(b) motion. Accordingly, if Plaintiff believed the trial 
court erred in denying his motion, the appropriate remedy was by 
direct appeal within the prescribed thirty (30) day period. Arnica 
Mutual Insurance Company, supra at 970. 
Defendant's failure to give Plaintiff notice of entry of the 
Default Judgment does not operate to toll Plaintiff's time for 
appeal herein. Rule 58A(d) states: 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing 
party shall promptly give notice of the signing or entry of 
judgment to all other parties and shall file proof of service 
of such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time 
for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice 
requirement of this provision. 
Accordingly, the Rule specifically provides that failure of a party 
to give notice of entry of judgment has no effect upon the time for 
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filing a notice of appeal. Where Plaintiff received copies of the 
trial court's Order (R. 65-66) directing entry of Default Judgment 
against Plaintiff and of the proposed Default Judgment, Plaintiff 
is left without excuse. The Court merely signed the Order and 
proposed Default Judgment as it said it would. Plaintiff simply 
failed to appeal the matter within the time required by law. 
Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed. 
II. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER MATTERS RAISED BY THE 
PLAINTIFF ON APPEAL THAT WERE NEVER RAISED AT THE TRIAL 
COURT LEVEL. 
This Court has consistently held that matters not raised at 
the trial court level will not be considered on appeal, 
particularly where such matters could have been resolved in the 
lower court. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 (Utah 1987); 
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 495 (Utah 1980). Plaintiff was 
given notice of the trial court's proposed entry of default 
judgment against Plaintiff in the form of the Order (R. 65-66), 
Affidavit (R. 62-64) and Default Judgment (R. 73-74) served upon 
Plaintiff. With the knowledge that default judgment may be entered 
against Plaintiff and with the further knowledge that such entry 
may be imminent, Plaintiff filed an objection dated September 30, 
1989. (R. 68-69) The only issue raised by Plaintiff in its 
objection that is raised by the Plaintiff on appeal is that 
Plaintiff's Complaint somehow constituted an "inherent" response 
to Defendant's subsequently filed Counterclaim. Plaintiff's 
objection to the lower court made no claim of (i) judicial bias or 
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(ii) the lack of an evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP, 
two (2) issues now raised by Plaintiff on appeal. The absence of 
these issues in Plaintiff's objection to the lower court is 
particularly conspicuous where virtually all of the facts and 
circumstcinces now cited by the Plaintiff were apparent to the 
Plaintiff at the time of filing the objection dated September 30, 
1988 in the lower court. 
The Affidavit of Plaintiff's counsel in re disqualification 
(R. 104-115) cites the following factors in support of his claim 
of judicial bias: 
(a) Daines' appointment and subsequent proceedings in 
the case of State v. Hardy, initiated in 1985, Case No. 20896 
(R. 105); 
(b) The Order issued July 27. 1988 in State v. Hardy 
wherein Judge Christoffersen was allegedly held in contempt 
on July 27, 1988 (R. 110, 111).1 
(c) LHIW, Inc. v. DeLorean, Case No. 830021896, 
commenced in 1983 (R. 106); 
(d) Daines v. Cache County, Case No. 87-NC-0082-S, filed 
in 1987 and in which Judge Christof fersen is named as a party 
Defendant (R. 105-106); and 
(e) Sew Easy v. Cache County, Case No. 87-NC-0081-W, 
initiated in 1987 and in which Judge Christoffersen is also 
named as a party Defendant. 
Upon even a cursory review of Daines' Affidavit and the above 
factors cited by Plaintiff's counsel in support of Plaintiff's 
argument of judicial bias, leads to the immediate conclusion that 
virtually every fact upon which Plaintiff relies for its claim of 
xThe Order referred to by Plaintiff makes no reference or 
finding that Judge Christoffersen was held in contempt. 
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judicial bias was known to Plaintiff and/or Plaintiff's counsel at 
the time Plaintiff filed its objection to entry of the Default 
Judgment dated September 30, 1988. This is particularly clear 
where Plaintiff was a party to one of the actions and Plaintiff's 
counsel was also counsel of record for one or more parties in each 
of the actions cited by Plaintiff in support of its claim. 
At the time that Plaintiff filed its objection dated September 
30, 1988 no evidentiary hearing had been held in regard to the 
proposed Default Judgment, nor was such a hearing scheduled. There 
is no evidence the Plaintiff ever sought or requested such a 
hearing. This issue was previously considered by the Court in Katz 
v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 95 (Utah 1986). In Katz, the lower court 
had entered a Default Judgment against a party but had erroneously 
failed to hold a hearing on the issue of damages under Rule 
55(b)(2) URCP. There the Court held that even though the lower 
court erroneously failed to hold a hearing on damages, the 
appealing party could not assert such failure on appeal without 
having afforded the lower court an opportunity to rule thereon. 
Also citing Meyer ex rel. Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 
1984) and Atkins v. Household Finance Corp. of Casper, 581 P.2d 193 
(Wyoming 1978). 
Accordingly, Plaintiff, having failed to raise the issues of 
judicial bias and failure to hold an evidentiary hearing with the 
trial court, is now barred from raising those issues on appeal. 
Plaintiff's "new" issues on appeal should be disregarded as 
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belated, untimely and of no consequence where never raised at the 
trial court level• 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT BIASED AGAINST PLAINTIFF. 
In discussing the issue of bias and judicial prejudice, this 
Court defined those terms as being the existence of a "hostile 
feeling or spirit of illwill toward one of the litigants or undue 
friendship or favoritism toward one". Haslem v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 
520, 523. (Utah 1948) However, the question of bias and prejudice 
is to be addressed in the sound discretion of the judge against 
whom such bias or prejudice is alleged, to be determined in the 
same manner as any other matter coming before him. Haslem at 523, 
citing Muser v. Third Judicial District Court, 106 Utah 373, 148 
P.2d 802. 
Here, however, the issue of bias has not been raised in the 
lower court, excepting in Plaintiff's untimely motion to 
disqualify. (R. 100-103) Accordingly, the trial court has not 
had opportunity to review the same and thus no record is provided 
this Court upon which to review the issue of bias and prejudice. 
The mere filing of a motion and affidavit alleging bias and 
prejudice does not ipso facto cast suspicions upon the trial judge 
sufficient to disqualify him or to render his decisions a nullity. 
Further, the fact that the trial judge may have been a party 
litigant in one or more cases in which Plaintiff or its counsel was 
also a party or in which Plaintiff's counsel acted as counsel for 
one or more other parties is not of itself sufficient to disqualify 
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a trial court judge or to render his determinations in the lower 
court void or voidable. See State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1090 (Utah 
1988). 
The record on review has not one shred of evidence that the 
trial judge harbored any prejudice or bias against Plaintiff. 
Without such evidence in the record and no timely request for 
recusal ever being filed by Plaintiff, the decisions and judgments 
rendered by the trial court must be valid. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING UNDER RULE 55(b)(2) URCP, 
PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
A Default Judgment is not void by reason of the trial court's 
failure to hold an evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP. 
Application for the Default Judgment was made by motion to the 
court during the September 26, 1988 hearing (T. 1), in accordance 
with the first sentence of Rule 55(b)(2) URCP. Rule 55(b) states: 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiff's claim against a 
defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum which can only by 
computation be made certain, and the defendant has been 
personally served otherwise than by publication or by personal 
service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of the 
plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs 
against the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure 
to appear and if he is not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to 
a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, 
in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it 
into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to 
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any 
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order 
such references as it deems necessary and proper. 
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As is reflected in the Rule, no evidentiary hearing need be 
held if the claim upon which the Default Judgment is based is for 
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made 
certain• Here, Defendant's claim clearly specified a sum certain, 
i.e., $5(3,000.00. Accordingly, even the clerk of the trial court 
could have entered the Default Judgment. The Court's Order of 
September 29, 1988 directed the Clerk of the Court to enter Default 
Judgment on Defendant's Counterclaim in the amount of $50,000.00 
plus attorney's fees and costs as supported by Affidavit of 
Defendant's counsel. (R. 65-66) Based on such an Order one can 
hardly argue $50,000.00 is not a sum certain. Consequently no 
hearing is required. While Default Judgment was signed by the 
trial court judge, the clerk of the trial court actually enters it 
of record in the judgment record book of the Court. (R. 65-66) 
Whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary is left to the 
discretion of the trial court, as the Rule specifically states that 
the court "may" conduct such hearings "as it deems necessary and 
proper". In this regard, this Court has repeatedly held that the 
trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless there is 
clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. Airchem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429 (1973); 
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). Where a hearing is 
discretionary and where Plaintiff never requested a hearing, the 
trial court's procedure is absolutely correct. The trial court 
could hardly abuse discretion Plaintiff never asked it to exercise. 
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V. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ENTERING 
PLAINTIFF'S DEFAULT. 
Rule 12 URCP states in relevant part: 
. . . The plaintiff shall serve his reply to a counterclaim 
in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer 
• • • 
This Rule clearly requires an affirmative, subsequent reply to a 
counterclaim. Otherwise, there is no joinder of the averments in 
the counterclaim• In general, if matters which should be replied 
to are not met in or by reply, they are deemed admitted• 61A 
Am.Jur.2d, Pleading, §176 and §192. Further, this Court has 
specifically held that where a defendant makes a counterclaim 
denominated as such and the plaintiff fails to reply, the averments 
of the counterclaim were deemed admitted. Murdock v. Blake, 184 
P.2d 164, 169 (Utah 1971); Rule 8(d) URCP; Connor v. Roval Globe 
Insurance Company, 286 SE.2d 810 (1982). 
Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's Counterclaim within 
the required twenty (20) day period. Defendant served its Answer 
and Counterclaim upon the Plaintiff by mail, pursuant to Rule 5 
URCP on August 14, 1987. The Reply was due under Rule 12, URCP, 
on or before September 3, 1987. Plaintiff's Default was entered 
by the trial court on September 9, 1987, some twenty-six (26) days 
after the filing and service of Defendant's Counterclaim. Without 
moving to set aside the Default, Plaintiff filed a purported reply 
on September 18, 1987. However, Plaintiff's reply, thirty-five 
(35) days after the filing and service of Defendant's Counterclaim 
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and nine (9) days after the entry and service of Plaintiff's 
Default, is a nullity. 
While Plaintiff argues that its Complaint, constituted an 
"inherent" reply to Defendant's Counterclaim, that statement 
remains wholly unsupported. Indeed, counsel has no idea what that 
means and knows of no such concept in American jurisprudence. The 
sole authority cited by Plaintiff is Wells v. Wells, 272 P.2d 167 
(Utah 1954), which simply holds that it is the substance of a 
pleading rather than its title that determines its nature and 
character. There is no Reply to Defendant's Counterclaim. Indeed, 
both the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the case law of this 
jurisdiction make it clear that pleadings, such as counterclaims 
which state specific allegations and make prayers for relief, 
require specific, substantive responses. Murdock, supra; Rule 8(d) 
URCP. Plaintiff did nothing. 
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court as to 
whether or not Plaintiff made a sufficient reply to Defendant's 
Counterclaim. This Court has consistently ruled that it will not 
interfere with that decision unless it clearly appears that the 
trial court abused its discretion. Department of Social Services 
v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980). The trial court 
correctly applied the Rules. In fact, given what Plaintiff did and 
did not file with the trial court, there is nothing else the trial 
court could properly have done. 
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VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
Though not entirely clear in its Brief, Plaintiff appears to 
take issue with the trial court's dismissal of its Complaint, as 
part of its violation of due process argument. In this regard, it 
is noted that the Court, in Charlie Brown Construction v. Leisure 
Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah 1987) stated "the authority 
of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has 
generally been considered an 'inherent power,' governed not by a 
rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to 
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases." Citing Link v. Wabash Railroad 
Company, 370 U.S. 626, 630-631, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1388-1389, 8 L.Ed.2d 
734 (1962) Plaintiffs are required to "prosecute their claims with 
due diligence or accept the penalty of dismissal." Maxfield v. 
Fischler, 538 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Utah 1975). 
In the case at hand, it is noted that apart from its response 
to discovery action taken by Defendant (R. 42-43), Plaintiff took 
no affirmative action in this case from the time the Complaint was 
filed on June 30, 1987 until its dilatory reply to the court's sua 
sponte Order to Show Cause (R. 60-61), a period in excess of 
fourteen (14) months. Additionally, after the trial court had 
entered its Order Dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 65-66), no 
motion or other action was taken by Plaintiff to have such 
Dismissal set aside or reconsidered by the trial court. 
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Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a -matter within the 
broad discretion of the trial court. This Court should not 
interfere with that decision unless there is a clear showing that 
the trial court abused its discretion and there is a likelihood an 
injustice has been wrought. Charlie Brown, supra; Department of 
Social Services v. Romero. 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980). No 
such showing has been made by Plaintiff. 
VII. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
 f 
HAD JURISDICTION AND PLAINTIFF RECEIVED ALL DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS TO WHICH IT WAS ENTITLED. 
The concept of voidness as it applies to judgments is properly 
limited. In Brimhall v. Mecham, 22 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525, 526 
(1972) while affirming a judgment sought to be declared void, this 
Court specifically stated that the concept of a void judgment is 
to be "...narrowly construed in the interest of finality". A 
judgment is not presumed to be erroneous. On the contrary, it is 
presumed to be valid until vacated by some proper proceedings 
instituted directly for the purpose of correcting errors therein. 
Ericksen v. McCullouqh, 91 Utah 159, 63 P.2d 595 (1937). Every 
reasonable presumption in favor of the validity of a judgment will 
be indulged, where there is nothing on the record to support 
allegations of irregularity. 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 39. In 
this regard, Plaintiff undertakes a heavy burden it cannot meet. 
Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and over the 
subject matter and where the judgment rendered is not in excess of 
the jurisdiction or power of the court, no other error or 
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irregularity can make the judgment void. 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, 
§14. There being no jurisdictional limits on judgments rendered 
by a district court, the only matter for inquiry by the Court here, 
as to the issues of jurisdiction, is whether the trial court had 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and over the 
parties. §78-3-4(1) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). On these 
points the record is clear. The Plaintiff against whom the Default 
Judgment lies, invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court when it 
filed its Complaint (R. 1-3), thereby submitting itself to its 
jurisdiction. All acts complained of by Plaintiff in its Complaint 
occurred in Cache County and Defendant submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court without objection, in filing its 
Answer and Counterclaim. Accordingly, the existence of the trial 
court's jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter is evident 
and not subject to serious question. 
Neither did the trial court lose its jurisdiction over either 
the parties or the subject matter upon dismissal of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. Rather, the trial court retains jurisdiction over both 
the parties' and the subject matter of the action until all matters 
before it, whether raised in a complaint, counterclaim or 
crossclaim, have been disposed of. To hold otherwise would lead 
to the ultimate conclusion that any party filing a complaint, 
counterclaim or crossclaim with a district court would be able to 
unilaterally deprive that court of jurisdiction by merely 
withdrawing its claims or engaging in other acts or omissions that 
may result in the dismissal of such claims. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment declares that no state shall "deprive 
any person of life, libeirty or property without due process of 
law". The United States Supreme Court has never attempted to 
define with precision the words "due process of law," and in fact 
the phrase probably never can be defined so as to draw a clear and 
distinct line, applicable to all cases. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 
640, 92 L.Ed. 986, 68 S.Ct. 763. While it is true that no precise 
definition of the phrase "due process of law" can be given, the 
courts have frequently defined the phrase in general terms. It has 
been said that due process of law must be understood to mean law 
in the regular course of administration through courts of justice 
according to those rules and forms which have been established for 
the protection of private rights. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 
172, 44 L.Ed. 119, 20 S.Ct. 77. Endicotte - Johnson Corp. v. 
Smith, 266 U.S. 291, 69 L.Ed. 293, 45 S.Ct. 63. It is, in short, 
a general law administered in legal course according to the form 
of procedure suitable and proper, given the nature of the case. 
Due process of law has been broken down into its procedural and 
substantive aspects which in turn have been construed in modern 
jurisprudence to require the elements of notice and opportunity 
for hearing (procedural), and essential fairness and lack of 
arbitrariness (substantive). 
However, the mere fact that a person is unsuccessful in a 
matter involving life, liberty or property does not itself present 
a showing that there has been a violation of due process. The 
Fourteenth Amendment does not raise a federal question in every 
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case to test the justice of a decision. New York and NER Co. v. 
Bristol, 151 U.S. 56, 38 L.Ed. 269, 14 S.Ct. 437. If there has 
been a hearing or opportunity for hearing there is no violation of 
a guarantee. Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536# 70 L.Ed. 1074, 46 
Supreme Court at 613. 
Ironically, Plaintiff's claim of denial of due process is 
itself so vague that Defendant cannot identify the basis of such 
claim. Plaintiff makes no specific reference to a violation of the 
URCP. The record makes it clear that the URCP were complied with 
in every material respect. Plaintiff was given notice of (i) 
Defendant's Counterclaim (R. 16-18), (ii) the Default (R. 19-20) 
entered against it, (iii) the trial court's proposed dismissal of 
the action pursuant to the Court's sua sponte Order (R. 51-52) and 
(iv) the proposed Entry Of Default Judgment against Plaintiff as 
specified by the Court's minute entry (R. 53) and the proposed 
Order (R.65-66) as eventually signed by the trial court judge. 
Plaintiff had its day in Court on September 26, 1988 -
Plaintiff simply chose not to attend. Plaintiff never requested 
an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) URCP. Even after 
Plaintiff was apprised of the Court's action in dismissing its 
Complaint and ordering entry of Default Judgment against Plaintiff 
on Defendant's Counterclaim, Plaintiff never raised the issue of 
an evidentiary hearing under Rule 55(b)(2) URCP, even though the 
actual Default Judgment (R. 73-74) was not entered against 
Plaintiff for almost thirty (30) days. Even had Plaintiff 
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requested such a hearing, under 55(b)(2) it is discretionary with 
the trial court. 
Plaintiff's real objection is that the Rules of Civil 
Procedures were applied equitably, fairly and as intended. 
Plaintiff does not seek due process - Plaintiff seeks to escape due 
process. The rules of the Court are clear, precise and were 
properly applied by the trial court. 
Plaintiff has failed to present any rational argument to the 
Court as to the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court or 
as to why it has been denied due process of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's appeal is not timely and should be dismissed. For 
fourteen (14) months Plaintiff essentially did nothing to prosecute 
its case. Plaintiff failed to appear at the hearing on September 
26, 1988 in response to the trial court's Order To Show Cause and 
Order to Plaintiff to appear or have its case dismissed. Plaintiff 
failed to object in a timely manner to the Default Judgment entered 
against it. There has been no showing by the Plaintiff that the 
trial court engaged in any abuse of its discretion. Plaintiff has 
not been deprived of a right by any arbitrary actions of the trial 
court or without an opportunity to press and present its claim. 
Plaintiff's rights have been limited only by its own inattention, 
neglect and inaction. The actions of the trial court are proper, 
evidence a careful attention to and application of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and should be affirmed. 
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DATED this y^^tay of September, 1989. 
Brad H. Bearnson 
HAND CARRY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand carried four (4) exact copies of 
the foregoing Response To Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Reversal, 
Motion To Strike And Supporting Memorandum, to Plaintiff's 
Attorney, David Rainey Daines, at 1158 North 1750 East, Logan, 
Utah, 84321, this Aft*3ay of September, 1989. 
BHB/4 
sew. sup 
Tl-ffO/Ujh PAJOA-J 
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DN & HOGGAN 
ORNEYS AT LAW 
WEST CENTER 
'O BOX 525 
AN. UTAH 8432 I 
01)752-1551 
Brad H. Beamson 
bLSON & HOGGAN 
[Attorneys for Defendant 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
[Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AMD FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
[SEW EASY INDUSTRIES, INC. 
ja corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
pAVID R. MONTAGUE, 
Defendant. 
PRECIPE 
Civil No. 25813 
[TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE NAMED COURT: 
Plaintiff having been duly served with a Counterclaim and 
[having failed to answer or otherwise plead to the same within the 
litime allowed by law you will please enter the default of the 
NPlaintiff in the above captioned matter. 
DATED this 9th day of September, 1987. 
BHB: 50 
Brad H. Bearnson 
Attorney for Defendant 
•^mjf Numbe 
SEPq 1387 
8STHS. ALIEN, ( M 
AM ^ 3 
2/ 
-2-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Precipe to Plaintiff's Attorney, David R. Daines at USU Box 1328, 
Logan, Utah, 84332, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 9th day 
of September, 1987. 
DLSON & HOGGAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
56 WEST CENTER 
P.O. BOX 525 
LOGAN. UTAH 84321 
(801)752-1551 
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]Brad H. Bearnson - #1512 
bLSON & HOGGAN 
[Attorneys for Defendant 
j56 West Center 
(P.O. Box 525 
[Logan, Utah 84321 
^Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT ~r THE EIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, .N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
56 WEST CENTER 
P.O. BOX 525 
LOGAN, UTAH 0432! 
(801) 752-1 S51 
SEW EASY INDUSTRIES, INC. 
ia corporation, 
P DEFAULT 
vs 
[DAVID R. MONTAGUE, 
Civil No. 25813 
Defendant. 
!i 
! j I i i t h i s a c t i o n the Plaintiff Sew Ea s y I n d u s t r i e s , Inc. ha v i n g 
:been r e g u1ar1y served w i 11 i p ro c e s s, a nd ha ving f a i 1 e d t o a pp e a r 
a n d a n s w e r t h e D e f e n d a n t's C o u n t e r c 1 a i m o n f i 1 e h e r e i n , a i i :I t h e 
11ime a 11owed by 1 aw for answering having expired, the defau 11 oJ: 
the said P1aint i ff Sew Easy Industries, Inc. in the premises, is 
j h e r e by d i I 1 y e n t e r e d a c c o r d i n g • w. 
! Witness the Clerk of the sai-" sour with the s^i thereof jaffixed this 9th day of September, 1 987, 
Set! i S . Allen 
County Clerk 
T 5 , . 
•? 
\f\r\\ ' t\r -;-"Tr 
• « - * • 
S E P q 1387 
SCTHSAUBI,Clerf( 
H—ZZ^f Deputy 
I 
• 2 -
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t I ma i l ed an e x a c t copy of the f o r e g o i n g 
(Default t o P l a i n t i f f ' s A t t o r n e y , David R. Daines a t USU Box 1328, 
Logan, Utah, 84332, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 9 th day 
of September , 1987. 
> f r g E ^ / * - ^ 
• sy M&U, 
/ ^ s ^ , 
3LSON & HOGGAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
56 WEST CENTER 
PO BOX 525 
LOGAN UTAH 84321 
(801)732-1551 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
SEW EASY INDUSTRIES 
-VS-
MONTAGUE, DAVID R. 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
> 
) 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE NO 
Case No. 870025813 CV 
On it's own Motion, the Court orders Counsel in the above 
case to appear before the Court on: 09/26/88 at 10:03 AM, 
and show cause why this case should not be dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. 
Counsel's failure to appear will be considered 
acquiescense in entry of an order of dismissal. 
Dated this 1 3 day of ^ g JQX7 , 19. t 
VaKOY CHRISTOFFERSON 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Copies of the foregoing Order to Show Cause, mailed to: 
S E E A T T A C H M E N T 
this |g> day of ^ Q . ^ A 7 , 19.9S 
n/On c^ - ** ^ O . . ' ' Deputy Clerk 
SF.P1 31088 
SETH S. AHEM, Clerk 
5l 
A T T A C H M E N T 
DAINES, DAVID 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
USU BOX 1328 
LOGAN UT 84321 
BEARNSON, BRAD H. 
Attorney for Defendant 
56 WEST CENTER BOX 525 
LOGAN UT 84321 
Z. 
t-o3 SEP 27 *\2:3k 
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DAVID RAINEY DAINES (#801) 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
USU Box 1328 
Logan, Utah 84322 
Telephone: (801) 753 — 2721 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
SEW EASY INDUSTRIES 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAVID R. MONTAGUE 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO ENTRY 
OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
ON COUNTERCLAIM 
Case No. 25813 
Comes now the Plaintiff and objects to the entry of 
Default Judgment as agains t the P l a i n t i f f on the 
Counterclaim on the following grounds: 
1. The Plaintiff has not defaulted. 
2. Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiffs 
Complaint inherently denied all of the counterclaim 
allegations which arose out of the same transactions and 
occurrences alleged in the Complaint in the first instance. 
3. The record on answers to discovery and depositions 
clearly and precisely delineate Plaintiffs defenses to the 
counterclaim. 
4. Plaintiffs have filed a formal Answer to the 
Nut ' dumber 
counterclaim, 5=m 
SEP 3 n 1388 
IHS. ALLEN, C! 
iff—""" '—J*S nomrfu 
I^Q sTtta/mmcteift 
5. The Defendants have made no motion for entry of a 
default judgment. 
6. Though apparently a default was erroneously 
entered, parties have acted for about a year on the basis 
that all issues were still active. Should the court 
determine that Plaintiff should take formal action to have 
the default removed from the record the Plaintiff should be 
given an adequate opportunity to procedurally perfect its 
removal. 
David Rainey Dai 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of September, 
1988 I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Objection to Entry of Default Judgment on Counterclaim to 
the following, U.S. mail, postage prepaid: 
Brad H. Bearnson 
Miles P. Jensen 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys at Law 
56 West Center 
P. 0. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321-052 
DRD:m 
DM:007 
^avid Ra iney Q*ijies 
ioQ 
taSON & HOGGAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
56 WEST CENTER 
PO BOX 5 2 5 
OGAN, UTAH 8 4 3 2 1 
( 8 0 1 ) 7 5 2 - 1 5 5 1 
Brad H. Bearnson (#3633) 
DLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
SEW EASY INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER 
vs. 
pAVID R. MONTAGUE, 
Civil No. 25813 
Defendant. 
The Court on its own Motion, issued its Order to Show Cause 
Why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute the same, setting the matter for hearing on the 26th day 
pf September, 1988, at 10:03 a.m. Defendant timely filed its 
Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendant also filed a 
[Counterclaim against the Plaintiff which was not timely responded 
|to by the Plaintiff. The Court entered the Default of the 
plaintiff as to Defendant's Counterclaim on the 9th day of 
September, 1987. The Court having reviewed the file in this 
matter and having held the hearing on the Court's Order To Show 
Cause on the 26th day of September, 1988 at the hour of 10:15 
a.m., the Defendant being represented thereat by its counsel, Brad 
H. Bearnson, and the Defendant being neither present nor 
represented by counsel, it is hereby 
WumberQ IrQ 
&*? 
SEP2<M083 
mi 07.--fMt^i3g- * , — _ £ nan* 
SON & HOGGAN 
TORNEYS AT LAW 
,6 WEST CENTER 
PO BOX 525 
SAN UTAH 84321 
801)752-1551 
-2-
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint be and is hereby dismisse< 
by reason of Plaintiff's failure to prosecute the same; 
FURTHER ORDERED, that Default Judgment on Defendant's 
'Counterclaim, against the Plaintiff, be entered by the Clerk in 
the principal amount of $50,000.00, plus attorney's fees and costj 
as supported by the Affidavit of Defendant's legal counsel. 
ENTERED this JL9 -^day of September, 1988. 
ML ^
 Li 
VeNoy^ Chris toftersep/ District 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
irt Judge 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Order to Plaintiff's Attorney, David R. Daines at USU Box 1328, 
Logan, Utah 84321, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, this 27th day 
of September, 1988, 
BB/35 
Ua 
POOX 072PKE!98 
.SON & HOGGAN 
TTORNEYS AT LAW 
56 WEST CENTER 
PO BOX 525 
X3AN. UTAH 8432 1 
(801)752-1551 
v s . 
fbAVID R. MONTAGUE, 
RECEIVED 
ISBBOCT - 3 . PI* 3- 2 U 
Brad H. BearnsonC^(S33)»l!f.Tv i;L£RK 
lOLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE 
SEW EASY INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 25813 
The Plaintiff, Sew Easy Industries, Inc., having failed to 
timely plead or otherwise defend in this action and default having 
been entered against said Plaintiff. 
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant, David R. Montague, be awarded 
judgment against said Plaintiff in the amount of: 
$50,000.00 
$ 105.70 
$ 448.05 
$ 850.00 
$51,403.75 
Damages; 
Accrued interest to date of judgment, 
Accrued costs to date of judgment, 
Attorney's fees to the date of this 
judgment and such sums in addition thereto 
as Plaintiff may reasonable accrue in 
attorney's fees in enforcing and 
collecting this judgment and make proof 
thereof to this Court hereafter. 
TOTAL JUDGMENT, 
dumber # > 
'. 77 2^1980 
An 
SffBS,_flUE*I.Ctaft
 n a W 
eOOX 0 7 2 PAGE 7 7 0 
SON 8t HOGGAN 
rTORNEYS AT LAW 
56 WEST CENTER 
PO BOX 525 
GAN UTAH 84321 
(SOI) 752-1 551 
-2-
with interest on the total judgment at twelve percent (12%) 
per annum as provided by law from the date of this judgment until 
paid, plus after-accruing costs. 
DATED this 2*th day of S^p?omber, 1988,. 
VeNo^ r 
Distri 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Default and Default Judgment to Plaintiff's Attorney, David R. 
Daines at USU Box 1328, Logan, Utah 84321, postage prepaid in 
Logan, Utah, this 27th day of September, 1988. 
BB/35 
Brad seams on 
072«a77i 
7 ^ 
